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Statutory Interpretation in State Courts Indiana Opinions

A Study of

WILLIAM D. POPKIN*
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to 1980, statutory interpretation seemed to be a moribund
academic field. The dominant academic approach was established by
the Hart & Sacks Legal Process materials,' which reconciled the traditional creative power of common law courts with the policy of
deference to legislation. The Legal Process "solution" was to presume
that statutes were texts with a purpose, that the purpose was what
reasonable people would pursue, and that courts, sharing in that reasonable vision, could apply that purpose to resolve uncertainties within
statutory gaps. Statutes therefore set the framework within which courts
engaged in reasoned elaboration of legislative purpose. This system
preserved both legislative supremacy and judicial creativity.
Wide acceptance of the Legal Procegs solution appeared to end
academic debate about statutory interpretation. Except for Reed Dickerson's efforts to keep the subject alive, 2 the literature was sparse.
That changed in the last decade, and statutory interpretation became
a subject of intense academic interest. In retrospect, it appears that
the Legal Process solution matured around the time when new legislative
tensions were beginning to render its vision of the legislative process
obsolete. The romanticized idea of a reasonable legislature whose purpose(s) the court discerns now seems almost quaint after the recent
political turmoil over civil rights, income redistribution, budgets, and
deregulation. By the 1980s, the literature on statutory interpretation
began to catch up with the reality of the legislative process and to
put forth new visions of the judicial role.'
Two modern academic movements undermined the Legal Process
perspective. The Law and Economics perspective described the legislative
process as anything but reasonable and purposive. Instead, it depicted
the legislative process as one of bargaining by private interests producing

Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. H. HART & A. SACKS, Tm LEoAL PROCESS: BAsic PROBLEMS IN TH
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AND APPLICATION OP LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
2. His basic work is R. DICKERSON,
STATUTES (1975).
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3. For a review of the literature, see Frickey & Eskridge, Legislation Scholarship
and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 691 (1987).
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a document with no underlying purpose except that of limiting the
other side's advantage. 4 This undermined the notion that courts could
be creative in elaborating purpose and still be faithful to the statute. 5
The main rival to the Law and Economics movement is the Law
and Literature movement. It also undermined the Legal Process approach, but from a different point of view. While the Law and Economics perspective pulled the judge away from creative elaboration
of legislative purpose, the Law and Literature perspective emboldened
the judge to interpret statutory texts creatively. 6 Unlike the Legal Process
approach, however, judicial creativity did not fit snugly within the gaps
set by historical legislative purpose. Instead a statute was embedded
in the broader legal framework, consisting of evolving background
norms that were critical to the judge's attribution of statutory meaning. 7
In this untidy, post-Legal Process world, not everyone shares these
perspectives on statutory interpretation. Both the Economics and the
Literature perspectives are vulnerable to two contrasting objections.
First, as perspectives on legal interpretation, they underestimate the
power relationships that law privileges, sharing some of the complacency
of the Legal Process approach. The feminist critique of statutory
interpretation is the most articulate expression of this point of view.8
Second, rather than being too complacent about law, "Law and"
perspectives pay insufficient attention to the traditional legal values of
commitment to the statutory text and legislative intent. The legislative
text and historical legislative purpose are realities the interpreter cannot
neglect, even though their meaning cannot be perfectly recreated by
the judicial reader. An interpretive process that takes these traditional
legal values seriously will be different from one that freely indulges
interpretive presumptions about private interest legislative bargaining
or evolutionary background norms.
Many advocates of "Law and" approaches are coming to recognize
the importance of traditional concerns with legislative text and intent.

4. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533 (1983).
5. Critiques of the Law and Economics description of the legislative process appear
in Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873 (1987);
Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. Cm. L. Rv. 63 (1990).
See also Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65
Cm+.[-]KEr. L. RRv. 123 (1989).
6. A recent review and critique of the Law and Literature movement appear in
Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, I YALE J. L. & HuM. 1 (1988).
7. See Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. Rv. 20 (1988);
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987).
8. See West, Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature
Movement, I YALE J. L. & Hum. 129 (1988).
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For example, in the Law and Economics school, Judge Posner now
leans toward the traditional Legal Process view that the judge's task
is to imaginatively reconstruct legislative purpose. 9 And some commentators, who would be sympathetic with the Law and Litelature
movement, have shied away from its more radical implications, which
appear to disregard, or at least minimize, the role of the text and
legislative intent. They instead search for ways in which text and intent
can constrain the judge without denying a creative judicial role.' 0
The tempering of "Law and" perspectives to take account of
traditional concerns with text and intent has led to the development
of another school of thought based on legal pragmatism and practical
reason." In this view, no single approach to statutory interpretation
is acceptable, whether it is a presumption of private bargaining, evolutionary interpretation, or single-minded commitment to text and
intent. The importance of one or another criterion of interpretation
varies with the area of law and the statutory text; and, further, depends
on what the interpreter learns about statutory meaning from her en2
counter with the facts of the case.'
State court cases have not appeared prominently in the recent
literature on statutory interpretation. Three reasons may account for
this neglect. First, the arena for politically contentious legislation has
shifted to Congress. Law reform, once predominantly the domain of
state legislation (as in Workers' Compensation and the Uniform Commercial Code), is now largely dealt with by federal statutes (such as
securities law, replacing state fraud law; environmental law, superceding
state nuisance law; and civil rights law, supplanting state contract law).
Redistribution law is now either addressed by federal statute or by
state statutes complying with federal standards (as in tax, welfare, and
social insurance law).
Second, scholars interested in state law have traditionally focused
on the common law rather than statutory interpretation. 3 And, third,
state judicial opinions appear less self-conscious about interpretive theory than federal opinions, tending instead toward black letter canons

9.

R. Posn,

Tm FEDEL CouxrS: Ciusis AND REFoRM 286-93 (1985).

10. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN.
L. RE V. 321, 353-62 (1990).
11. See Eskridge & Fnckey, supra note 10; Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism,
86 MicH. L. REv. 827 (1988); Popkin, The CollaborativeModel of Statutory Interpretation,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 543 (1988).
12. See generally Eskridge, Gadamer/StatutoryInterpretation, 90 Cow. L. REv. 609

(1990).
13.

(1982).

A major exception is G.

CAIABRBs,

A CommoN
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of construction. This approach appears to leave little room for academic
4
comment, except to repeat the traditional criticism of these canons.
The neglect of state statutory interpretation is unfortunate. Two
of the issues prominent in contemporary literature can be profitably
explored in the context of state cases. First, the reliance on black letter
canons in state court decisions is a symptom of an emphasis on the
statutory text and legislative intent." If we are experiencing a revival
of traditional interest in text and intent in statutory interpretation,
state court cases are a good place to consider its advantages and pitfalls.
Second, the fact that state court opinions tend to be innocent of
interpretive theory makes them fertile ground for observing how judges
actually make interpretive choices, including whether they behave in
the manner predicted by any of the "Law and" approaches to statutory
interpretation.
Part IIA of this Article will explain how Indiana decisions apply
traditional concerns for the statutory text and legislative intent. Part
IIB will analyze the cases for what they reveal about the process of
judicial choice to determine statutory meaning. The primary source
material was a Westlaw search of opinions specifying the West Statute
Keynote (number 361) during the period from 1980 to July 1990. The
prior and later history of each case was also examined. This revealed
a potential shortcoming in gathering data because the statute keynote
number was not always used by West even though the case involved
6
an interesting interpretive issue.'

One note of caution is in order before we begin examining Indiana
cases. Judicial rhetoric about statutory interpretation is often unhelpful.
Responding to the need to speak authoritatively and yet be deferential
to the legislature, courts will refer to a litany of interpretive criteria
including plain meaning of the text and legislative intent, 7 with little

14. The classic criticism is Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 V, D. L. Rav. 395

(1950).
15.

There is a cautious revival of interest in the canons. See Eskridge, supra note

12, at 662-64; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
405, 451-54 (1989).

HARv.

L. REv.

16. The first citation in the following cases does not refer to the statute key number,
but the second citation does. Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 1990),
rev'g, 526 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Wallis v. Marshall County Comm'rs, 531 N.E.2d
1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 546 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. 1989); Community Hosp. v. McKnight,
482 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 493 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1986); Rensing v. Indiana
State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983), rev'g, 437 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982); Indiana Dep't of Revenue v. Glendale-Glenbrook Assocs., 404 N.E.2d 1178 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980), rev'd. 429 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981).
17. See, e.g., In re Middlefork Watershed Conservancy Dist., 508 N.E.2d 574, 577
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apparent concern for the complexity of the underlying concepts or
whether they have any explanatory power in deciding a case. It is
therefore sometimes necessary to separate what the court says from
what it does.
In one respect, the rhetoric in Indiana cases is especially misleading.
Indiana courts often state that a text with a plain meaning blocks
statutory interpretation. 8 The image of a text as a barrier to interpretation fails to capture the practical reasoning process by which
judicial readers explicate a text. A text is more accurately viewed, not
as a barrier, but as a starting point and as one of many interpretive
criteria. The judge makes an initial pass at the relevant text (narrowly
defined to be just one or a few words), and, considering the facts,
makes a tentative judgment about whether the facts obviously come
within the text. Then begins the back and forth process of deciding
whether the tentative judgment should prevail. Evidence of legislative
intent and a consideration of important background values may place
pressure on the initial text-based conclusion. The statutory language
is examined again and may be expanded to include more words within
the relevant statute and other statutes. If this back and forth process
converges to a single meaning, the temptation to say that the meaning
is plain and to describe the text as a barrier may be irresistible. But
the barrier would be breached in an appropriate case and is, in fact,
tentatively breached as the interpretive process unfolds, perhaps unconsciously. ,9

(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (intent; goals, reasons and policy; context; plain meaning of text;
presumption against illogical or absurd meaning; etc.); Alvers v. State, 489 N.E.2d 83, 89
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (statute not viewed in isolation; words given plain meaning; look to
subsequent enactments; presumption against illogical or absurd meaning; narrow construction
of criminal statute; etc); Herbert v. State, 484 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (clear
language barrier to interpretation; legislative intent fundamental); Jones v. Hendricks County
Plan Comm'n, 435 N.E.2d 82, 83-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (is language uncertain; if so,
determine legislative intent; primarily use language; rely on plain, ordinary meaning); Indiana
Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Osco Drug, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 823, 833-34 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982) (will not interpret unambiguous language; if ambiguous look at intent, with spirit
prevailing over letter of law; legislature presumed aware of existing statutes; statutes interpreted
in pari materia; specific prevails over general; change of text implies change of meaning; and
legislative inaction implies acquiescence).
18. Well over 40 of the 333 opinions examined contained this statement. See, eg.,
Heltzel v. Thomas, 516 N.E.2d 103, 106 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (may not interpret language
plain on its face).
19. Occasionally a decision will acknowledge this complexity: "[I]t is not the clarity
or ambiguity of the words used in a statute that determine whether judicial construction of
the statute is appropriate; rather it is the clarity or ambiguity of the meaning those words
give to the statute as a whole." Winona Memorial Found. v. Lomax, 465 N.E.2d 731, 737
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis in original).
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The Statutory Text and Legislative Intent

1. Conception of the text.-A court that is determined to rely
on the statutory text must still decide what the relevant text is. It can
focus narrowly on the plain meaning of a word or two, on the statute
as a whole, on the entire body of statute law, or on changes in statutory
language over time. This section considers Indiana courts' conception
of the statutory text.
a. Plain meaning, common understanding, and literalism
Judges often claim to focus on the plain meaning of one or two
key words in a statutory text,20 but there is a right and a wrong way
to do this. The right way is to identify the audience intended by the
legislative author and to determine whether that audience and the
statute's likely public audience share a common understanding about
what the words mean. When these two meanings converge, there is a
common understanding between author and reader, and the text can
2
be said to have a plain meaning. '
Another form of "plain meaning" ' interpretation goes by the pejorative label "literalism." This is the wrong way to go about interpreting texts. The literalist is not really concerned with how an audience
understands language but instead disregards what the audience is likely
to understand. Indiana courts usually avoid literalism in this sense of
22
the term.
Literalism can occur in two ways. First, the court disregards the
text's intended and likely audience. This often has the effect of privileging colloquial usage over technical meaning. For example, in Indiana
Department of State Revenue v. Food Marketing Corp.,23 the issue
was the meaning of "cost of goods sold" for determining the amount
deductible in computing taxable gross income. The dissent appealed to
the colloquial meaning of the term,24 which, in its view, included not
much more than the price paid for the product sold. The majority

20. See, e.g., Herbert v. State, 484 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("may"
implies discretion).
21. The most common way in which the intended and the likely public audience can
differ is when an old statute contains terms whose meaning changes over time.
22. The term "literalism" is not always used to describe the approach to interpretation
that I have criticized. Sometimes it is used as a synonym for plain meaning in the sense of
common understanding.
23. 403 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
24. Id. at 1098 (Staton, J.,dissenting).
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adopted the more technical accounting meaning that included various
indirect overhead costs attributable to the goods purchased for resale.25
The majority's reading made more sense in a tax statute aimed at a
technically sophisticated audience, 26 and therefore deserves to be characterized as an effort to identify plain meaning in the correct sense
of "c6mmon understanding."
Second, "literalism" emphasizes the grammar of the text with little
regard for how language is actually used and understood. Examples
include treating use of the singular or plural as dispositive, assuming
that the disjunctive "or" always means an alternative, and according
conclusive weight to punctuation. English language writers are not
always grammatically precise, and a literal "grammatical" approach
may therefore be unfaithful to how meaning is communicated. Realizing
this, Indiana courts are reluctant to adopt too grammatical an approach
27
to statutory interpretation.
b.

Statute as a whole

A text-based alternative to focusing on one or two words of a
statute is to consider the text of the whole statute, as Indiana courts
frequently do. 28 The instinct to examine the entire text is well entrenched

25. Id. at 1096-97. See also Foremost Life Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Ins., 274 Ind. 182,
186-87, 409 N.E.2d 1092, 1097 (1980), in which the majority appealed to a technical distinction
in the industry between insurance and reinsurance to define the statutory language, and
determined that "reinsurance" was not "insurance." The dissent relied on a more colloquial
meaning of the statutory terminology ("insurance," "insurer," and "insured"), and applied
what it considered an ordinary definition of "insured" to include reinsurance contracts, Id.
at 1098-99 (Stanton, J., dissenting).
26. The majority actually claimed that it was adopting the ordinary rather than the
technical meaning of the phrase "cost of goods sold," Food Mktg. Corp., 403 N.E.2d at
1096, but the dissent correctly characterizes the majority opinion as adopting a technical
definition. Id. at 1098 (Stanton, J., dissenting).
27. Singular and plural: see, e.g., Watkins v. Alvey, 549 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990) (plural not relied on); Northwest Ind. Educ. Assoc. v. School City of Hobart,
503 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (singular not relied on).
Disjunctive "or": see, e.g., Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 418 N.E.2d 207, 210 (Ind.
1981) (reading "or" as providing for alternatives would defeat obvious legislative intent).
Punctuation: see, e.g., Hill v. State, 488 N.E.2d 709, 710 (Ind. 1986) (punctuation not
dispositive), rev'g. 482 N.E.2d 492, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on ordinary meaning
of punctuation). But cf. Spears v. State, 412 N.E.2d 81, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (court
relied on the literal use of commas to block consideration of legislative intent).
28. See e.g., Kinder v. Doe, 540 N.E.2d 1ll, 114-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (court
looked to all sections dealing with immunity and confidentiality in child abuse reporting
situations to determine when identity of a news reporter could be obtained); Sears & Roebuck
& Co. v. Murphy, 511 N.E.2d 515, 516 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (statute construed so
language consistent with other parts of the statute); Selmeyer v. Southeastern Ind. Vocational
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in some of the traditional canons of construction such as ejusdem
generis (general words embrace things similar to prior specific references)
and expressio unius est exclusio alterius (reference to one thing excludes
others; or, as Indiana courts often put it, "what is unsaid is as important
as what is said"). 29 Using the expressio canon, however, is often as
misguided as being literalist, by attributing to an omission from the
text the same sanctity that the literalist accords to a single word or
"rule" of grammar without regard to what the statute's audience would
infer) 0 The main objection to the expressio canon is that the legislature
will often specify a result about facts to which it has paid attention,
without prejudging situations about which it is silent. The basic instinct
of the Indiana courts to look at the whole statute is sound, however,
whatever the execution.
c.

Other statutes

The frequency with which Indiana courts consider the entire body
of statute law to help interpret a particular statute was an unexpected
finding, based on prior familiarity with federal cases. It is not known
whether the Indiana pattern is typical of other states, but there are
two plausible reasons for possible differences between state and federal
approaches. First, state law encompasses more subjects than federal
law, even though the impact of state law is now politically less dramatic.
The potential for several statutes covering the same issue is therefore
greater. Second, legislative history in the conventional sense of com-

School, 509 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (two sections read together to limit
applicability of first section); Gary Community Mental Health Center, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't
of Pub. Welfare, 507 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (in light of other provisions
requiring "hospital care," the court interpreted statute requiring services to be performed "in
a hospital" to mean services provided "by a hospital"); Indiana Tele. Ass'n. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n 477 N.E.2d 911, 916-17 (nd. Ct. App. 1985) (words in one part of statute construed
to have same meaning in other parts of the act); Edward Rose of Ind. v. Fountain, 431
N.E.2d 543, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (because none of surrounding sections pertaining to
notice referred to tenant obligations, statutory notice provision interpreted to apply only to
landlords); Suburban Homes Corp. v. Harders, 404 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(reference in preceding section to constructed drain indicates that another section does not
apply to "natural" watercourse).
29. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion County v. Marion County, 470 N.E.2d 1348,
1355, 1356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (reference to expressio canon); Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n
of Marion County v. Villages, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (what is not
said is important; also reference to expressio canon); In re Turin, 436 N.E.2d 130, 132 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982) (what statute does not say is important).
30. See, e.g., Seymour Nat'l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (Ind. 1981)
(exception for false arrest and imprisonment implies no other exceptions); Rensing v. Indiana
State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983) (exclusion of certain employees
implies inclusion of university athletes), rev'd, 437 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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mittee reports is often unavailable at the state level, and clues to
statutory meaning must be found elsewhere, such as in the texts of
other statutes."
There are several ways in which multiple statutes are considered
by Indiana courts. First, similar language in statutes with a common
purpose (statutes in pari materia) is interpreted in the same way.32 It
is also a short step from inferring that the use of the same language
in different statutes implies a common result to assuming that different
language implies different results. Although the court will make that
assumption in many cases," mechanical application of this approach
31. Testimony of the legislative drafter occasionally substitutes for traditional legislative
history. See Irmscher v. McCue, 504 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (testimony by
one of statute's drafters); Indiana Dep't of Revenue, Ind. Gross Income Tax Div. v. GlendaleGlenbrook Assoc., 429 N.E.2d 217, 219 n.1 (1981) (testimony by state legislator about statutory
purpose). See also Winona Memorial Found. of Indianapolis v. Lomax, 465 N.E.2d 731,
739-40 n.7 (court cited law review articles written by drafters who lobbied for medical
practitioners in support of a position contrary to their interest).
Another form of legislative history is the change in text as the statute works its way
through the bill drafting process. See Gallagher v. Marion County Victim Advocate Program,
Inc., 401 N.E.2d 1362, 1365-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) and id. at 1370-71 (Chipman, J.,
dissenting) (both majority and dissent relied on changes made during the drafting process,
but they disagreed about their significance).
32. In re Paternity of Joe, 486 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 n.l (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("best
interests of child" given same meaning in contexts of visitation and child custody under
paternity and divorce statutes); Beasley v. Kwatnez, 445 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983) ("vending machine" given same definition in property tax and gross retail sales tax
laws); Barr v. Sun Exploration Co., Inc., 436 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ind. 1982) ("operation for
oil and gas" given same meaning in two statutes). Cf. Tobias v. Violent Crime Compensation
Div., 470 N.E.2d 105, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (pecuniary loss concept, developed by cases
under workers' compensation, has same meaning when in Victims Compensation Act).
Common law and statutory rules may also be harmonized. See DeHart v. State, 471
N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (statutory violation inferred on basis of analogy to
common law nuisance law).
State statutes may be given the same meaning as similar federal statutes. Alvers v.
State, 489 N.E.2d 83, 87-89 (nd. Ct. App. 1986) (Indiana's anti-racketeering statute and
federal RICO statute); United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Northern Ind. Pub.
Serv. Co., 436 N.E.2d 826, 829 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (Indiana's Anti-Injunction Act and
federal Norris LaGuardia Act); In re CTS Corp., 428 N.E.2d 794, 798.99 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) (Indiana's Business Take-Over Act and federal Williams Act); In re City Investing Co.,
411 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (same); Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, Inheritance
Tax Div. v. Estate of Wallace, 408 N.E.2d 150, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (Indiana and
federal estate tax law). But see Flynn v. Klineman, 403 N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (state and federal securities law interpreted differently).
33. See Blood v. Poindexter, 534 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ind. T.C. 1989) (language of
Trust Code and Probate Code varies); Minton v. State, 400 N.E.2d 1177, 1179 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980) (language of two criminal statutes differs with reference to inclusion of guilty
pleas). Cf. Lake County Beverage Co. v. 21st Amendment, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1008, 1012-13
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (language and interpretation of Indiana statute and federal RobinsonPatman Act differ).
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is as misguided as mechanical application of the expressio canon.
Language differences are not routinely indicative of differences in
4
meaning. For example, language may be added to clarify one statute,
not to differentiate its meaning from another statute. The court may
even be justified in incorporating the approach indicated by the text
of one statute into another law, despite language differences."
Second, two statutes that deal with same subject must be harmonized
(also sometimes referred to as statutes in pari materia).3 6 The canon
that specific statutes prevail over general statutes is usually applied
without controversy," implementing the idea that the text that is more
focused on the facts of the case should prevail. The specific prevails
even when the general statute is the later-passed law,3" despite the

34. See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 446 N.E.2d
1337, 1339-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (language was added to a statute to affirm an interpretation
reached in a case; the interpreted language also appeared unamended in another statute, which
the court interpreted in the same way, even though it had not been amended).
35. Holland v. King, 500 N.E.2d 1229, 1235-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (statute omits
reference to "last known address," which appears in another statute; the court concluded
that both statutes require mailing to last known address).
36. Hines v. Behrens, 421 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stay of execution
statute and foreclosure statute); In re Lemond, 413 Ind. 228, 245-46, 413 N.E.2d 228, 24546 n.15 (1980) (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Child in Need of Services Act).
37. See, e.g., Wayne Township of Allen County v. Hunnicutt, 549 N.E.2d 1051, 1053
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Ferguson v. Modern Farm Sys. Inc., 555 N.E.2d 1379, 1383-84 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1990); Southwest Forest Indus., Dunlap Div. v. Firth, 435 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982); In re Waltz' Estate, 408 N.E.2d 558, 560-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
When a general statute prevails over a specific statute, there is usually a sound textual
basis. See, e.g., K-mart Corp. v. Novak, 521 N.E.2d 1346, 1350-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
(Violent Crimes Compensation Act cross references Workers' Compensation statute, implying
that more specific Crimes Act did not supercede Workers' Compensation law); Citizens Action
Coalition of Ind., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Ind., 425 N.E.2d 178, 184-85 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981) (general statute prevails because it contains a provision that it applies unless
"expressly provided by statute"). See also State ex rel. Indiana Life & Health Ins. Guar.
Assoc. v. Superior Court of Marion County, Room No. 7, 272 Ind. 421, 426-27, 399 N.E.2d
356, 359 (Ind. 1980) (prior enabling act granting jurisdiction to the superior court survives
passage of later special proceeding act requiring certain claims to be filed in the circuit court,
when prior law expressly provides for concurrent and co-extensive jurisdiction within the
circuit court).
It is usually easy to tell which is the more specific statute. But see Gilbert v. State,
411 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("private road" more specific than "not a part
of a through highway," on the ground that latter phrase might include more than a private
roadway).
38. Johnson v. LaPorte Bank & Trust Comm'rs, 470 N.E.2d 350, 355 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984); County Council of Bartholomew County v. Department of Pub. Welfare of Bartholomew
County, 400 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
Often the opinion is silent as to which statute is earlier. See Sanders v. State, 466
N.E.2d 424, 428 (Ind. 1984); Bell v. Bingham, 484 N.E.2d 624, 627-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985);
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presumption that a later statute usually takes priority in cases of conflict
39
over an earlier law.
In other instances, several statutes may deal with the same general
area of law but there is no more specific text to prevail over the more
general language of another law. The court, in such cases, must work

out a sensible pattern to harmonize the statutes

°

A number of theories might explain the courts' purpose in consulting
several statutory texts to interpret one of them. 4' One theory is that
examining several statutes implements legislative intent because the
drafter is likely to have the entire body of law in mind when writing

statutes.42 This cannot, however, explain all of the cases in which
multiple statutory texts are considered. The refusal to allow a general
statute to take precedence over a specific law rests on the assumption
that the legislative drafter did not focus carefully on the specific statute,
but that the legislature would have wanted the specific law to survive
if it had paid attention. Moreover, when later law influences the meaning
of prior law,'43 the court is not likely to be making a genuine inference

about what an omnipotent legislative drafter intended.

Hoage v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1362, 1363-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Souder, 444 N.E.2d
891, 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Sexton v. Johnson Suburban Utils., 422 N.E.2d 1293, 1296
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Wagner v. Kendall, 413 N.E.2d 302, 304-305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
39. Blood v. Poindexter, 524 N.E.2d 824, 825 (Ind. T.C. 1988).
40. See, e.g., McClaskey v. Bumb & Mueller Farms, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989) (Marketable Title Act relieves the covenants imposed by a warranty deed
only to the extent that a claim is extinguished by the Act, thereby harmonizing the Act with
another statute governing warranties of title); State v. Magnuson, 488 N.E.2d 743, 751 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (Department of Safety and Police Department statutes dealing with statistics
gathering were harmonized by concluding that earlier statute imposing obligation to gather
statistics was not impliedly repealed by later law dealing with same general subject); Wright
v. Gettinger, 428 N.E.2d 1212, 1219-20 (1981) (voting procedure statutes harmonized to
determine that prior law requiring clerk to sign ballots survives in part after passage of
Electronic Voting System Act); County Council of Monroe County v. State ex rel. Monroe
County Bd. of Pub. Welfare, 402 N.E.2d 1285, 1288-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (agency powers
harmonized under State Personnel Act, Welfare Act of 1936, and county council statutes).
41. This discussion may also apply to language in the same statute, if the drafter
does not consider carefully how the portions of the text interact. Moreover, if different parts
of the same statute are not passed during the same session, the text resembles two statutes
passed at different times. See, e.g., Indiana Tel. Assoc. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 477
N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (parts of the Public Service Commission Act passed
in 1913 and 1951).
42. Indiana cases incorporate this idea when the courts state that the legislature is
presumed to be aware of prior law. See Wayne Township of Allen County v. Hunnicutt,
549 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Blood v. Poindexter, 534 N.E.2d 768, 771
(Ind. T.C. 1989).
43. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Marion County Victim Advocate Program, Inc., 401 N.E.2d
1362, 1368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (the language "required ... by any rule or regulation of
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A second theory explaining why courts examine the entire body
of statute law is that sophisticated readers will consider this body of
law when deciphering the meaning of any one statute. However, this
explanation also seems farfetched because it rests on the possibly
unwarranted assumption that the text is being read by very sophisticated
readers.
Much as courts dislike admitting it, judicial reliance on the text
of multiple statutes may not implement legislative intent or the understanding reached by sophisticated readers. Instead, examining multiple statutes may achieve a number of institutional goals, such as
forcing the legislature to pay closer attention to what it writes, encouraging lawyers to read the entire body of statute law, and discouraging judges from excessively creative speculation about legislative
purpose. Finally, the examination of multiple statutes may simply be
a judicial method for dealing with an absence of legislative history to
provide concrete evidence of legislative intent.
d.

Change in statute over time

Indiana courts also rely on the relationship between several statutory
texts when there is a change in statutory language over time. They
often presume that a change in language implies a change in meaning"

any administrative body or agency" contained in a 1953 statute was read in light of a 1969
statute specifying how an agency makes rules). The dissent questioned how a later law could
be used to interpret a prior statute. 1d. at 1369 n.I (Chipman, J.,dissenting).
44. Relevant events in cases arose qfter passage of the second statute: Wallis v.
Marshall County Comm'r, 546 N.E.2d 843, 844 (Ind. 1989); Bonge v. Risinger, 511 N.E.2d
1082, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Second Nat'l Bank of Danville v. Massey-Ferguson Credit
Corp., 478 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Metropolitan School Dist. of Martinsville
v. Mason, 451 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Ware v. State, 441 N.E.2d 20, 2223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Aeronautics Comm'n of Ind. v. State ex rel. Emmis Broadcasting
Corp., 440 N.E.2d 700, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Landers v. Pickering, 427 N.E.2d 716,
718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Froberg v. Northern Ind. Constr. Inc., 416 N.E.2d 451, 453-54
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Div. v. Lees, 418
N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
Relevant events in cases probably arose after passage of the second statute: Lake County
Beverage Co., v. 21st Amendment, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Tarver
v. Dix, 421 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); In re Wisely's Estate, 402 N.E.2d 14,
16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
Relevant events in cases arose before passage of the second statute: State v. Page, 472
N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Wright v. Fowler, 459 N.E.2d 386, 389-90 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984); Pierce Governor Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 426
N.E.2d 700, 702-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Van Orman v. State, 416 N.E.2d 1301, 1305 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981).
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unless the better explanation for the change is an attempt to clarify
the law. 45 Perhaps the inference that legislative drafters have prior
statutes in mind is more plausible when statutory texts are changed
than in other cases in which statutory texts are interpreted as part of
an integrated body of law.
When changes in later law are used to infer the meaning of prior
law, as happened in a number of the cases cited above, 46 two problems
arise. First, the intent of a later legislature is often very doubtful
evidence of what the legislature adopting the prior statute meant. 47 The
influence of later law on the meaning of a prior statute is therefore
an example of retroactive legislation, which runs counter to the usual
presumption against retroactive statutes. 4 Second, the retroactive impact
may be unfair if the events are governed by the earlier statute and
arise prior to passage of the second statute. There is no way the
affected parties can draw inferences about the meaning of prior law
49
from statutes not passed when the events occur.
This is not to suggest that the use of a later statutory text to
influence the meaning of prior law is necessarily wrong. Retroactive
texts are very familiar when they occur in the form of common law
opinions. Perhaps the use of later statutes to interpret prior law is an

45. The relevant events in the following cases arose before passage of the clarifying
statute. Watkins v. Alvey, 549 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (statute explicitly states
it is a clarification); Alvers v. State, 489 N.E.2d 83, 88-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Pike County
v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1188, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (some events before and some after
second statute); Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Bates & Rogers Constr., Inc., 448 N.E.2d
321, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Marsym Dev. Corp. v. Winchester Economic Dev. Comm'r,
447 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); H.W.K. v. M.A.G., 426 N.E.2d 129, 134 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981).
46. See supra notes 44-45.
47. See Wechter v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 544 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. T.C.
1989) aff'd. 553 N.E.2d 844 (1990)(later law bad evidence of original intent); Bailey v. Menzie,
505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (intent of a later legislature is unreliable evidence
of intent of legislature that passed earlier statute). See also Hobbs v. State, 451 N.E.2d 356,
359 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (the court rejected a statement in a preamble about the meaning
of prior law). When the second law is passed during the same legislative session, however,
the second statute may reflect the intent of those enacting the prior law. Cf. H.W.K. v.
M.A.G., 426 N.E.2d 129, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (the fact that a change occurred within
five months of original passage supports the view that the second law was a clarification).
48. See Appendix § V.
49. The retroactive impact of a later statute is not unfair if the events precede the
effective date of the later law but follow the passage of the statute. This occurred in American
Underwriters Group, Inc. v. Williamson, 496 N.E.2d 807, 809 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986);
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Strutco Div., King Seeley Thermos Co., 540 N.E.2d 597,
597-98 (Ind. 1989). rev'g, 530 N.E.2d 116, 119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (treating addition of
language as change in law). As long as the events follow passage, there is notice of the later
statute on which the parties can rely.
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unacknowledged example of the assimilation of statute law to a pattern
of lawmaking long familiar in the common law.
e. Summary
In sum, Indiana cases are rarely literalist in their approach to the
statutory text: quite the opposite. They are committed to a broad
definition of the text, often placing great weight on the use of language
in other statutes and in earlier and later versions of the same statute.
Defining the text broadly may not, however, serve the public reliance
values that are usually associated with judicial deference to the text.
Courts may instead be looking at the entire body of statutory law to
force legislatures and lawyers to think of statutes as an integrated body
of law, in much the same way that the common law has traditionally
been viewed as a seamless web.
2.

Conflict Between Text and Intent.-

a. Defining the problem
The concept of legislative intent is as complex as the concept of
a "text." 50 One meaning of "intent" is the broad concept of legislative
purpose, such as "favoring social insurance claimants." Those who
object to creative judicial elaboration of legislative intent usually have
this concept in mind because judicial speculation about purpose may
exaggerate one of several purposes (often one side of a legislative
bargain) or underestimate the extent to which an overbroad statute was
purposely adopted.5 ' The better definition of legislative intent, and the
50. The values supported by deference to legislative intent are not the same as those
served by deference to the text. Adherence to a fairly narrow definition of the text (excluding
other statutes, for example) will usually preserve reliance interests by adhering to the most
straightforward reading of the text, reduce discretion in interpreting the law, and preserve
the integrity of political language. Adherence to legislative intent (assuming it can be identified
with some confidence) implements legislative supremacy. When the evidence of the text's
meaning and legislative intent points to the same result, as they often do, there is no tension
between these two criteria. But tensions between the meaning of the text and legislative intent
sometimes appear and must be resolved.
These generalizations about the effect of relying on text and intent require some
qualification. If the text is given an expansive definition, its meaning becomes less certain,
undermining the ability of deference to the text to protect reliance interests and discourage
interpretive creativity. It is often asserted that judicial speculation about legislative intent is
a common means by which interpreters exercise discretion, as observations about actual intent
shade off into plausible intent and, finally, into speculation that the legislature would pursue
good policy. But sticking to the text may also give rein to interpretive discretion when a
choice must be made between narrower and broader definitions of the relevant text.
51. See, e.g., M & K Corp. v. Farmers State Bank, 496 N.E.2d 111, 112-13 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (statute conclusively presumes that the risk of loss for employee forgery rests
on employer and does not allow proof that a negligent bank was better able to prevent loss
in a particular case).
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one we will be concerned with here, is specific intent in the sense that
the legislature would have wanted a particular result on *the facts of
the case.
A judge often has difficulty guessing what the legislature's specific
intent would be. Translating general purpose into specific intent is
often very difficult. Background values such as the presumption that
statutes are not in derogation of the common law and the liberal
interpretation of social legislation are not sufficiently persuasive in most
cases to be confidently equated with legislative intent." Nonetheless,
an honest attempt to identify legislative intent will sometimes produce
the conviction that intent and text conflict, requiring a judicial resolution. When such a conflict occurs, judicial rhetoric is available to
permit trumping the text with intent. Thus, an absurd interpretation
of the text is to be avoided and absurdity is often determined by
reference to presumed legislative intent.5 3 The court can also invoke
intent, even in the weak
background values in support of legislative
54
form of preserving "public convenience."
b.

Specific legislative intent

Two Indiana cases in which specific legislative intent clearly trumped
the text involve tax issues. In both, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed
the lower court's adherence to the letter of the law. One decision
imposed a tax, counter to the traditional pro-taxpayer presumption,
and the other permitted an exemption in contradiction of the presumption against tax exemptions. 5 In Park 100 Development Co. v.
Indiana Department of State Revenue,5 6 the court considered a statute
taxing partnerships with a corporate partner. The intent of the statute
was to prevent corporate taxpayers from avoiding the corporate tax
by forming partnerships. The state tried to tax a partnership with three

52. Other problems with determining specific legislative intent include determining how
evolutionary the author's intent might be, regardless of the document's historically contingent
context, and deciding whose intent counts (the intent of a legislative committee, for example).
53. Hill v. State, 488 N.E.2d 709, 710,(Ind. 1986) (absurd to read statute as allowing
exempt retail sales of fireworks, given legislative intent). See also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Northern
Ind. Pub. Serv., Inc., 486 N.E.2d 1082, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (literal reading of "public
utility" rejected because it would include homeowner engaged in backyard gardening in the
defimition); Vickery v. City of Carmel, 424 N.E.2d 147, 149-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (court
corrects textual anomaly that would exempt property outside city from eminent domain
procedure applicable to property in city).
54. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. Town of Wolcott, 433
N.E.2d 62, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (prevent absurdity and hardship and favor public
convenience); Sidell v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 428 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981); Walton v. State, 398 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Ind. 1980) (same).
55. See Appendix § IV.
56. 429 N.E.2d 220 (Ind. 1981), rev'g, 388 N.E.2d 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
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partners, one of which was a partnership that itself had a corporate
partner. The corporate partner was attempting to avoid the statute by
interposing a partnership between it and another partnership. The court
of appeals applied the letter of the law, permitting the use of the
intervening partnership to avoid tax. The supreme court applied statutory intent to impose tax."
Indiana Department of Revenue, Indiana Gross Income Tax Division v. Glendale-Glenbrook Associates8 dealt with the same statute
taxing partnerships with a corporate partner. The facts of the case,
however, involved an otherwise exempt corporation (an insurance company) that was a partner. The supreme court upheld the exemption,
overruling the lower court's decision to impose tax by relying on the
statutory text.59
Another case of intent trumping text runs counter to an even more
hallowed presumption - the narrow construction of criminal law. In
Hill v. State,6° a semicolon in the wrong place made the text appear
to permit retail sales of fireworks if a retail buyer affirmed his intent
to ship the fireworks out of state. The court, however, invoked legislative intent to permit only wholesale sales, reversing the lower court's6
decision that the criminal accused was entitled to the letter of the law. 1
c.

Background values

Another way a court can prefer legislative intent over the text is
by appealing to background values in the light in which the legislature
is presumed to have acted. Statutory interpretation cases abound with
such substantive presumptions, such as: narrowly interpreting statutes
in derogation of the common law, and its antidote, the liberal interpretation of welfare statutes; strict interpretation of criminal law; nar-

57. Id. at 222-23. Another case in which the taxpayer was denied the benefit of plain
meaning is Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Ropp, 446 N.E.2d 20, 25 (Ind. Ct. App.

1983) (notice of hearing amounted to substantial compliance with statutory requirements
because any error did not prejudice the taxpayers).
58. 429 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. 1981), rev'g, 404 N.E.2d 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
59. Id. at 218-19 (the statute clearly intended to close a loophole that the taxpayer
was not attempting to exploit).
60. 488 N.E.2d 709, 710 (Ind. 1986), rev'g, 482 N.E.2d 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
See also Watkins v. Alvey, 549 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (intent of criminal law
prevails over literal construction of statute dealing with pyramid schemes).
61. Effective after this case, the Indiana legislature amended the statute to exempt
retail sales if the fireworks were shipped out of state within five days of purchase. Apparently,
a written signed statement from the purchaser will protect the seller. IND. CODE ANN. § 2211-14-4(a)(l)(B), (b)(4) (Burns 1986) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 229-1985 § 2, April 19,
1985). Whether this means that the court misread the enacting legislature's intent or that the
fireworks industry now had sufficient political clout to get its way is unclear.
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row construction of taxing statutes; and, looking in the other direction,
construing tax exemptions against the taxpayer; and, the presumption
that statutes are prospective unless they are remedial or procedural. It
is usually a mistake to assume that these presumptions implement
legislative intent in any realistic sense of the term. A presumption
serves that purpose only when the reader can confidently say that the
legislature's failure to incorporate the presumption into the text is an
obvious oversight, that applying the presumption "goes without say-

ing." Instead, these presumptions are usually obsolete generalities. At
best, they have little predictive value for the results of a case. 62 This
is documented in the Appendix to this Article, reporting Indiana cases
that both follow and refuse to follow the presumptions traditionally
invoked to justify specific statutory interpretations. At worst, judicial
discussion of a presumption obstructs analysis, as when the judge
speculates about whether a tax deduction should be subject to the
presumption disfavoring tax exemptions, 63 or the majority invokes the
presumption against taxation and the dissent invokes the maxim discouraging tax exemption." The best course would be for the court not
to invoke the substantive presumptions at all, a trend that may be
65
discernible in at least some tax cases.

The only presumption with much explanatory power for predicting
judicial decisions is that favoring the accused. Many of the cases on
this issue, cited in Section III of the Appendix, gave the accused the
benefit of the doubt, even to the point of allowing the appellate court

62. See Llewellyn, supra note 14.
63. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Endress & Hauser, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 1173,
1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (it is not clear whether deductions are strictly construed, like
exemptions; but, in any event, the case did not deal with a deduction per se because the
issue was whether a deduction that was clearly allowed under the federal income tax is allowed
under the Indiana income tax); Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Food Mkt. Corp., 403
N.E.2d 1093, 1101-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (Staton, J., dissenting) (deductions are strictly
construed, like exemptions).
64. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Food Mktg. Corp., 403 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980) (majority says tax statute should be interpreted in favor of taxpayer, id. at
1096, and Judge Staton, in dissent, says deductions are like exemptions, to be interpreted
against taxpayer, id. at 1101-02); Dep't of State Revenue v. National Bank of Logansport,
402 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (majority says no ambiguity so no room to apply
presumption against tax exemption; in any event, should interpret tax law in favor of taxpayer,
id. at 1010, and Judge Buchanan, in dissent, applies a presumption against tax exemption,
id. at 1011).
65. For example, no presumption was mentioned in the following tax cases: Blood
v. Poindexter, 534 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. T.C. 1989); Matter of Souder's Estate, 421 N.E.2d 12
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Matter of Waltz' Estate, 408 N.E.2d 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Matter
of Wisely's Estate, 402 N.E.2d 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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to reverse a trial court's finding on a question of fact. 6 In a few
criminal cases, the background value favoring strict construction may
explain the court's reading of the mens rea requirement into the text.67
It is possible that another reader of Indiana opinions would uncover
other cases in which intent appears to trump a clear text, but the
effort would not be worthwhile. The statutory text can be defined in
so many ways by expanding and contracting the relevant language that
a plausible claim of textual uncertainty can often be made. Intent can
also be identified in different ways, so that at least one plausible
definition will coincide with a text-based argument. Clear conflict between text and intent is therefore unusual; probably only in a small
number of cases there would be agreement that such a conflict existed.
In the meantime, more interesting statutory interpretation problems
might be neglected. These problems concern how to interpret statutes
with a complex text and with different types of evidence of legislative
intent and background considerations, all of which must be filtered
through the judge's perspective on which criteria of statutory meaning
are most important. The following Part IIB turns to these issues.
B.

Judicial Choice and Statutory Interpretation

How do Indiana courts make choices about what weight should
be attributed to different criteria of statutory meaning and whether to
apply any of the "Law and" approaches to statutory interpretation?
Section IIB1 discusses cases in which the court appears to choose the
plain meaning of the text as the dominant interpretive criterion, but
in which there is evidence that policy considerations are driving the
court's decision to defer to the text. The back and forth process of
evaluating statutory language, legislative intent, and background considerations may eventually alight on the text, but the decision to favor
the text over non-text based interpretive criteria seems influenced by
the particular values served by this result.
Section IIB2 examines Indiana decisions to determine whether the
"Law and" approaches to statutory interpretation have had any impact.
Some evidence exists that the Law and Economics perspective, which

66. See Sheppard v. State, 484 N.E.2d 984, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (the appellate
court rejected a finding of fact by the trial court that phone calls were "coercive" and
therefore constituted obstruction of justice).
67. State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963, 965-68 (Ind. 1989), rev'g, 530 Ind. App. 747
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Miller v. State, 496 N.E.2d 592, 593 (Ind. Ct. App.), vacated, 502
N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind. 1986).
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expects private interest bargaining to underlie a statute, has sometimes
prevailed. The evolutionary approach to statutory interpretation is also
occasionally adopted, but the courts are loathe to admit it. In any
event, "Law and" perspectives are selectively applied, in keeping with
a pragmatic and practical reasoning approach to statutory interpretation,
rather than in the spirit of a devotee wholeheartedly committed to a
particular "Law and" perspective.
1. Judicial "Choice" to Rely on the Text.-The judicial decision
to rely on the text appears deferential, but we should not necessarily
take judicial rhetoric at face value. The text may sometimes be chosen
as part of a complex interpretive process whereby text, legislative intent,
and background considerations interact to determine statutory meaning.
This process can be observed in a group of Indiana cases dealing with
law enforcement, means-tested welfare, and land use control by property
owners. These areas of law raise difficult and contentious policy issues,
and the court will often argue that it is simply deferring to the plain
meaning of the text, eschewing policy concerns. There is no easy way
to determine whether deference to the text is a neutral principle or
whether the court defers to the text because it serves a particular policy
objective, that remains unstated. However, we are entitled to be suspicious about the claim that deference to the text is a neutral principle
if the text is rejected in other cases to implement the very same policies
which were served by deference to the text in another case. This
suspicion is reinforced if those policies are favored in deciding a case
in which the statutory text is unclear. Policy choices, in other words,
may sometimes drive the decision to defer to the text.
a. Lawsuits involving law enforcement
Two cases seem to apply the statutory text's plain meaning to
prevent lawsuits that might disrupt law enforcement. In Seymour National Bank v. State,68 the statute provided governmental immunity,
as follows: a "governmental entity or an employee acting within the
scope of his employment is not liable if a loss results from . . . the
adoption and enforcement of, or failure to adopt and enforce, a law,
.
unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false
imprisonment." 6 9 A plaintiff injured in a high speed police chase sued
the state. The plain meaning of the text indicated that the defendant
was immune and the majority agreed, stating that the statute granting
immunity for "enforcement of . . . law" was clear.

68. 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind.), reh'g granted, 428 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. 1981).
69. Id. at 1223-24 (quoting IND. CODE § 344-16.5-3(7) (1974) (as amended in 1976)).
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The dissenting judges thought that granting complete immunity to
police officers engaged in law enforcement was harsh 70 and unreasonable. 7' Justice Hunter rejected the view that the legislature intended a
literal application of the statutory language, and invoked the image
72
of a police car crashing into a playground.
On rehearing, 73 the majority adhered to its view that the text was
clear, but then qualified its earlier opinion to preclude immunity if
the acts were "so outrageous as to be incompatible with the performance
of the duty undertaken. . . Such acts, whether intentional or willful
or wanton, are simply beyond the scope of employment. '74 The court
did nothing to dispel the idea that plowing into a playground might
be within the scope of employment and, therefore, immune.
In Burks v. Bolerjack, the plaintiff sued a sheriff for false imprisonment. 7 The statute protected government employees from suit,
as follows: "A judgment rendered with respect to or a settlement made
by a governmental entity bars an action by the claimant against an
employee whose conduct gave rise to the claim resulting in the judgment
or settlement. ' 76 A claim against the government arising from the same
facts had been dismissed because the plaintiff failed to provide timely
notice, and a subsequent suit against a sheriff was then dismissed under
the statute on the ground that the statutory text's plain meaning barred
the suit.
The court of appeals considered this result "absurd, ' 77 and the
supreme court's dissent deemed it "arbitrary and inequitable." ' 78 The
lower court concluded that the claim would not have been barred if
the plaintiff had sued the sheriff directly, without first suing the
government. It therefore made no sense to bar the plaintiff from suing
the government employee just because its suit against the government
was not timely. 79 The supreme court's dissent interpreted the statute
to apply only when the suit against the government was resolved on

70. Id. at 1227 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1228 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1227-28 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
73. Seymour Nat'l Bank v. State, 428 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. 1981).
74. Id. at 204. At the same time, however, the majority admitted that immunity was
unnecessary when acts were beyond the scope of employment because the government would
not then be liable, and said nothing to dispel the impression that the state would not be
liable if a police car engaging in a high speed chase crashed into a playground. Id.
75. 427 N.E.2d 887, 888 (Ind. 1981).
76. Id. at 889 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-5 (Bums Supp. 1980).
77. Burks v. Bolerjack, 411 N.E.2d 148, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).
78. Burks, 427 N.E.2d at 891 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
79. Burks, 411 N.E.2d at 151.
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the merits, in effect extending the government's res judicata claim to
employees.

0

.

The opinions in these two cases could be analyzed as simply a
conflict between the statutory text and the potentially harsh policy
implications of applying its clear meaning. In this view of the inter-

pretive process, the harsh policy implications of tort immunity were
irrelevant. The text simply prevailed. Another decision suggests, how-

ever, that policy concerns about disrupting law enforcement played a
significant role in the court's decision to rely on the text.
Gallagher v. Marion County Victim Advocate Program, Inc.' dealt
with access to public records. The statute made available to the public
"any writing in any form necessary, under or required, or directed to
be made by any statute or by any rule or regulation .... "82 The
writings at issue were material prepared by police officers at the scene
of a crime or accident setting forth the location, time, and description
of the event, with names of victims, witnesses, or suspects. These
writings were sought by an association whose purpose was to aid victims
83
of violent crime.
The text-based arguments marginally favored disclosure. As the
dissent noted, the statute explicitly required a liberal construction of
its provisions favoring disclosure," and explicit exceptions from disclosure in other statutes did not mention the type of records in this
case. 5 The dissenting judge also could not accept the dramatic consequences of barring disclosure, which left public access to routine
6
police records at the unfettered discretion of-the police department.
The majority decided, however, that these records were kept in
accordance with discretionary police practice, which did not fall within
the statute mandating disclosure of records "required" by "statute,
rule or regulation. 8' 7 The court took the somewhat unusual position

80. Burks, 427 N.E.2d at 891 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
81. 401 N.E.2d 1362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
82. Id. at 1363 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1-2(l) (Burns Supp. 1976)).
83. Id.
84. Id.at 1369-70 n.2 (Chipman, J.,dissenting)..
85. The majority dealt satisfactorily with the fact that a special exception from disclosure
of police records had been deleted as the bill passed through the legislature. The draft from
which this was deleted contained a broad definition of publicly available records. The final
bill both deleted the exception and narrowed the definition. Id.at 1366. According to the
majority, the combination of the deletion and the narrowing of the definition precluded any
inference about disclosure of police records in the final statute. The dissent made much of

the deletion, arguing that the deletion of an exception for police records implied a "conscious
legislative decision to include police records within the definition of public records." Id.at
1370 (Chipman, J., dissenting).
86. Id.at 1369, 1371.
87. Id.at 1367-68.
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that a later statute determining how agency rules were to be adopted
defined what constituted a "rule" under the prior statute, even though
the legislature whose intent was at issue could not have been aware
of the later provision about adopting agency rules."8
The majority was quite aggressive in asserting its disinterest in
policy concerns, stating that "[in the construction of statutes, we have
nothing to do with questions of policy and political morals; such matters
are for the consideration of the Legislature. . . . Consideration of
hardships cannot properly lead a court to broaden a statute beyond
its legitimate limits." 9 The majority protested too much. Certainly,
nothing in the statute's text forced or even strongly indicated a decision
one way or the other. If anything, the text favored disclosure. It is
hard to imagine that the court reached its decision without making a
policy judgment that law enforcement might be too disrupted by permitting access to police records. We may, therefore, infer that the
decisions relying on the text to provide immunity from suits that might
interfere with law enforcement" were also influenced by the fact that
deference to the text served the same goals. 91 This inference is further
reinforced by the fact that Indiana courts in nonlaw enforcement
92
contexts do not favor sovereign immunity.

b. Means-tested welfare
Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Guardianship of McIntyre93 involved a Welfare Department claim to recoup government
payments of medical expenses from a welfare recipient's subsequent

88. Id. at 1368. The dissent explicitly disagreed with this analysis. Id. at 1369 n.1
(Chipman, J.,dissenting).
89. Id. at 1364.
90. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
91. Justice Hunter's opinion on rehearing in Seymour Nat'l Bank v. State, 428 N.E.2d
203, 205 (Ind. 1981) (Hunter, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part), also illustrates how
text-based arguments are sensitive to policy concerns. Confronted with the majority's concession
that the most extreme cases of wanton and willful misconduct did not constitute "enforcement
of law" and were therefore not immune, id. at 204, he shifted the grounds of his dissent
(which was unfavorable to immunity) to argue that the "enforcement of a law" language
was ambiguous, rather than that its literal meaning should not be applied. Id. at 205-06
(Hunter, J., dissenting).
92. For example, in Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n,
424 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), the statute permitted suits against "persons." Despite
a tradition against interpreting the statutory term "person" to include the state, the court
permitted the suit, using very strong anti-immunity language. Id. at 1032 ("The logic of the
law today does not support the use of sovereign immunity to bring the State outside a statute,
when the statute strongly implies otherwise.").
93. 471 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
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tort recovery. The statute gave the government a lien against tort
94
recoveries "to the extent of the amount paid by the department,"
in effect according the government a right of subrogation based on
the financial aid it provided the tort victim. The court held that this
language clearly gave the state a first claim to the entire tort recovery.
An initial pass at this language seems to support the majority's
conclusion that the statute "clearly" gives the government first claim.
According to the dissent, however, policy considerations suggested that
the funds should be allocated in accordance with the court's discretion. 95
Insurance ceilings and defendant insolvency made recoveries inadequate
and the plaintiff often had additional injury-related expenses that could
be paid out of some portion of the recovery, if the government did
not get it all. Without a clear statement in the statute, the dissent
concluded that the statute incorporated the traditional judicial practice
of exercising equitable discretion when distributing recoveries to holders
of subrogation rights.
As for the statutory language, the dissent compared the language
of the Indiana law to a Wisconsin statute" which stated that, after
attorney fees, the money "paid by the state should be deducted next
and the remainder paid to the public assistance recipient.1 97 That was
clear language giving the government first claim to the tort recovery.
Under pressure from the dissent's policy concerns and traditional
equitable discretion practice, the majority was not so certain that the
statute's text was clear. It justified its result by expanding the relevant
text to include a prior statute that had used the word "subrogation"
and had been interpreted to give courts equitable discretion.9" However,
the term "subrogation" had been deleted from the statute by the time
this case arose, which suggested that the discretionary judicial power
to qualify the government's recoupment rights had been withdrawn. 99
The majority did not explicitly reinforce its commitment to the
text with policy justifications for not allowing judicial apportionment
of tort recoveries, even though a concern for protecting government
revenue was a strong candidate. Should we therefore assume that such
policy concerns played no part in the decision? Was the text the most
important criterion, with other considerations playing only a tangential
role? Or was the text a convenient way to implement the policy of
protecting government revenue?
94. Id. at 8.
95. Id. at 10 (Young, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97.

Id. at 9.

98. Id.at 8.
99. Id. at 8-9.
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The decision in another welfare case involving eligibility for a state
medical assistance program covering hospital treatment' ° suggests that
the text is not the dominant criterion the court might have us believe.
The statute made eligibility dependent on the claimant being "financially
unable to defray" medical costs.' 0' The administering agency decided
to use the financial standards in the federal-state Aid to Dependent
Children (ADC) program. Because the claimant had too much income
to receive ADC, she was not considered "unable to defray" medical
costs. The court allowed the agency to use that standard to determine
eligibility for state medical assistance, thereby making the claimant
ineligible and forcing the hospital to seek recovery of the costs from
02
the claimant.'
No one would pretend that the statutory phrase "unable to defray"
costs was clear, but the dissenting opinion favoring the welfare claimant
seemed to have the better text-based argument. The dissent noted
another statute that stated that the Welfare Department "may" recover
medical expenses from a recipient who is able to repay medical costs
over a period of time. 03 This would have provided a mechanism by
which the claimant could have received medical assistance from the
state and paid it back out of funds in excess of the ADC financial
eligibility level. The majority resisted treating this statutory mechanism
as a reason for precluding agency use of ADC standards for threshold
eligibility. It interpreted the statute's text as applying only to future
recoveries by the claimant after receipt of medical assistance, not to
assets held at the time the medical help was provided.' 4 The dissent
objected to this distortion of the text, noting that the statutory repayment mechanism said nothing about payment only out of "future"
recoveries but provided for execution of repayment contracts whenever
the welfare department determined that repayment was possible. 05
The dissent also called attention to the strange policy effects created
by the majority's decision. If the case involved the federal-state Medicaid
program rather than a state aid program, the excess income would not
have disqualified the claimant. Instead, any "excess" over minimum
income levels for ADC eligibility would have been used to reimburse
the government for the medical assistance. The state was therefore
depriving the claimant of medical benefits by borrowing a federal-state

100.

Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Kosciusko County,

426 N.E.2d 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
101. Id. at 75.
102. Id. at 76.
103. Id. at 77 (Staton, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 76.
105. Id. at 77 (Staton, J., dissenting).
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ADC income standard that the federal-state Medicaid program itself
would not have used.' °0 Finally, the effect of the majority's decision
was to encourage claimants to defer purchase of medical help, which
in the long run increases medical costs.' °7
The dissent's discussion explicitly called attention to a theme the
majority never acknowledged - that the real issue was how strongly
to protect government revenues by making the hospital, rather than
the government, seek reimbursement of medical costs out of any excess
income.' 0 Given the fact that the dissent had the better text-based
argument, the suspicion arises that a concern with government revenues
strongly influenced the majority's decision to place the financial burden
on the hospital. This also supports the suspicion that relying on the
text to give the government first claim to recoup medical costs from
subsequent tort recoveries was influenced by the fact that it preserved
government revenue. 109
c.

Land use by property owners

Another example of a text-based opinion probably influenced by
policy considerations is Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler. ' '0 The
case questioned whether a residential facility for the developmentally
disabled could be excluded from a subdivision by a covenant limiting
use to residential purposes, on grounds that the facility was run as a
business. The majority read the statutory text very closely to favor the
property owner's power to make land use decisions with minimal
restraints.
The statute contained two sections, one limiting zoning laws hostile
to residential facilities for the developmentally disabled, and the other
limiting private covenants hostile to such facilities for both the disabled
and mentally ill. The court compared the two sections. The zoning
section stated that a zoning ordinance could not exclude a residential

106. Id. at 76 (Staton, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 77 (Staton, J., dissenting).
108. Id. Compare Gary Comm. Mental Health Center, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 507 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), in which the court limited government aid
to medical services provided "by a hospital." The statute provided for aid for services "in"
a hospital but other portions of the statute referred to the services being provided "by" the
hospital.
But see State ex. rel. Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township, Marion County, 418 N.E.2d
234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), in which the township trustee tried to limit welfare shelter benefits
to renters, not owners. The court denied the trustee this power, observing that this would
encourage mortgage default and homelessness. The consequence of the decision was, however,
to deny discrimination between renters and homeowners, not necessarily to increase costs.
109. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
110. 505 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).

1180

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1155

facility for the developmentally disabled "solely because the residential
facility is a business." The covenant section used different language. "
It stated that a covenant could not both allow residential use and
prohibit a residential facility for the developmentally disabled and
mentally ill. It failed to say that the covenant prohibition could not
be based on the ground that the facility was a business. The court
took this to mean that any business could be excluded by a covenant,
including residential facilities for the developmentally disabled." 2 The
majority also concluded that the residential facility was a business
because of the landlord's profit-making motive, rather than the activities
of those living in the house."'
This was a very close reading of the statute indeed given the statute's
obvious purpose, noted by the dissent," 4 of mainstreaming the developmentally disabled."' Admittedly, there was a difference in the language of the zoning and covenant sections. However, it is more than
likely that the statement in the zoning section, that a residential facility
for the developmentally disabled cannot be zoned out on the ground
that it is a business, applied to both the zoning and the covenant
section. The drafting could have been more careful, but it is the
majority's reading of the text that seems strange given the statutory
purpose of mainstreaming the developmentally disabled." 6 It also seems
unlikely that the real estate developers and their advisors who are the
likely audience for this statute would read it to permit private covenants
to prohibit residential facilities that zoning laws could not prohibit. A
policy preference for protecting a property owner's right to choose his
neighbors almost certainly influenced the majority's decision to adopt
7
a close text-based reading.'

I1l. The court emphasized that the sections were drafted the same year, reinforcing
its argument that the difference was purposive. Id. at 462-63.
112. Id. at 463-64.
113. Id. at 469, 474 n.4 (Miller, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 467 (Miller, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 473-74 (Miller, J., dissenting).
116. After this decision, the Indiana legislature retroactively prohibited private covenants
from excluding residential facilities for the developmentally disabled and mentally ill from
residential areas on the ground that the residents are unrelated or for any other reason. Ind.
Code § 16-13-21-14 (1988). The retroactive impact of this statute was upheld in Minder v.
Martin Luther Home Found., 558 N.E.2d 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), rev'g, Clem v. Christole,
Inc., 548 N.E.2d 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The opinion was written by Judge Miller, who
had dissented in Adult Group Properties, Ltd., 505 N.E.2d 459.
117. The court noted that the covenant limiting use to residential purposes was important
to the property owners. Adult Group Properties, Ltd., 505 N.E.2d at 461. The court also
noted that any other reading of the statute would permit an unconstitutional taking of the
landowner's property. Id. at 464-65.
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2. "Law and" Theories.-We have said little in this review of
Indiana cases about the "Law and" perspectives that appear so prominently in the current literature on statutory interpretation. There is a
good reason for this. "Law and" perspectives provide only a partial
description of the interpretive process. Despite the rhetoric, their purpose is to assure that a particular point of view receives some attention,
not to completely explain the interpretive process. Thus, the Law and
Economics perspective is an antidote for judges who engage in too
freewheeling an extrapolation of statutory purpose, especially when that
would undermine the text. And evolutionary perspectives brought by
the judicial reader to the statute suggest that judges can sometimes
update legislation, contrary to the common law view of statutes as
static, time-bound documents.
There are, not surprisingly, some Indiana cases that look closely
for the private interest bargain struck by the statute and others that
consider the need to update statutes under certain circumstances. These
cases are described in this section. There is no evidence, however, that
these approaches are applied with a single-minded commitment.
a. Implementing the bargain
There are several ways the law and economics perspective on legislative bargaining can provide insight into statutory meaning. First,
it can call attention to the possibility that the legislative intent consisted
of a bargain. This occurred in a case in which a statute allocated
service areas to electricity providers." 8 A rural electric cooperative and
investor-owned company filed a joint petition allocating a service area
to the cooperative pursuant to the statutory procedures that required
petitions to be filed by a certain date. The Utility Regulatory Commission failed to meet its statutory deadline for approving or disapproving the petition. After the specified time limits, the investor-owned
company filed a petition to modify, which the Commission approved." 9
The question was whether the statutory time limits were mandatory or
whether the Commission could approve a modification after those limits
had expired.
The court held that the time limits were mandatory, so that the
Commission was not authorized to approve a petition to modify after
the deadline. 20 It supported its conclusion with an explanation of the
background for the statutory deadlines which was one of endless dis-

118.
1019 (Ind.
119.
120.

United Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 549 N.E.2d
1990), rev'g, 515 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1023-24.
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putes over service areas. The court observed that both rural electric
cooperatives and investor-owned companies supported the legislation
to bring these disputes to a halt, 21 strongly implying that the deadlines
were the product of an agreement between these two contesting interest
groups. Permitting a later petition by the investor-owned company to
challenge the prior petition filed in accordance with the statutory
guidelines would unsettle the statutory bargain.
Second, the Law and Economics perspective can highlight the fact
that a bargain omits certain groups. For example, the supreme court
rebuffed an effort by a lower court to treat athletes as "employees"
for Workers' Compensation. 2 2 Its opinion rested on a text-based argument about the meaning of the language "contract of employment." '' 23 But the court also could have noted how unlikely it was that
university athletes were included in the bargain underlying Workers'
Compensation whereby a plaintiff gives up potentially large tort claims
24
in exchange for certain but limited Workers' Compensation benefits.
Third, the Law and Economics perspective counsels against favoring
one of the interests represented in the statutory bargain. Other interests,
pushing in the other direction, may have negotiated limits to the statute's
impact. Thus, favoring employees who apply for unemployment insurance when they are indirectly involved in a labor dispute may
improperly displace the concerns of employers, who are also parties
to the governing statute.'25
The use of the Law and Economics approach as an antidote to
26
"liberal" interpretation of one of several conflicting legislative purposes'
is both a strength and potential weakness. It is important to recognize
statutory limits, but equally important to understand the role of judicial
choice in defining those limits. Two interests may bargain to a statutory
result, but identifying where the point of equipoise lies when the statute

121. Id.at 1021.
122. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983),
rev'g, 437 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
123. Id.at 1172-73.
124. A complete argument about the statutory bargain would examine the state of the
law when the Workers' Compensation statute was passed. If state university employees could
not sue in tort, it is unlikely that they were part of the statutory bargain because they had
nothing to give up in exchange. If student athletes can now sue in tort, an evolutionary
approach to statutory interpretation might include them in the statute.
125. See, e.g.,
Aaron v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 416 N.E.2d 125,
132-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (court held that when nonstriking employees of a multi-plant
employer are laid off as a result of a selective strike of that employer, they are directly
interested in the labor dispute and therefore not eligible for unemployment benefits, if the
nonstriking employees are in the same bargaining unit as the striking employees).
126. See Appendix § II.
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is applied to specific cases depends on the strength and weakness of
the values each interest group contributes to the statute. Defining that
point requires policy judgments concerning, those values, which is not
mandated by what the legislature has done. An example from the
Indiana cases concerns the interpretation of the Medical Malpractice
Act, which requires choosing between protection of medical care providers and tort plaintiffs.
The Medical Malpractice Act was passed to protect health care
providers from medical malpractice claims so that medical insurance
would not drive them out of business. It is therefore readily understood
as a private interest bill, protecting a group of potential defendants
from common law liability. But how much protection should they
receive?
"Malpractice" is defined as any "tort . . . based on health care
or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered,
by a health care provider, to a patient. 11 27 "Health care" is defined
as any "act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should
have been performed or furnished, by a health care provider for, to,
or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment,
or confinement. ' ' 2 The statute established a panel of doctors to review
claims, and permitted its conclusions about standard of care to be
admitted into evidence.' 29 It also imposed damage ceilings' 30 and a
special statute of limitations.' 3 '
In two cases, the court invoked the Act's policy of protecting health
care providers as support for a broad definition of those covered by
the statute. For example, the statute covered suits by a "patient or
his representative." Representative was defined by the statute to include
the patient's "parents." The parents were therefore subject to the act
even when they sued on their own behalf, not for their child.'3 2 Additionally, a plaintiff who had been committed to an institution at his
wife's request by a doctor who did not examine him was still a "patient"
under the statute.'33 The court determined that the statute did not
require the plaintiff to have a contract with the doctor, as long as his
wife had one.
When the courts reached the question of the type of activity covered
by the statute, however, they had more trouble interpreting the law.
127. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-1(h) (Burns 1990).
128. Id. § 16-9.5-1-1(i).
129. Id. § 16-9.5-9-1 to -10.
130. Id. § 16-9.5-2-2.
131. Id. § 16-9.5-3-1.
132. Sue Yee Lee v. Lafayette Home Hosp. Inc., 410 N.E.2d 1319, 1323-24 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980).
133. Detterline v. Bonaventura, 465 N.E.2d 215, 217-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).

1184

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1155

In the 1982 case of Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc. v. Rioux, the
plaintiff fell and broke a hip, alleging that the health care provider
had "negligently . . .failed to provide appropriate care to prevent said
fall and injury."'1 34 The court made the case sound simple, stating that
the very broad language of the statute did not need construction, and
that the "duty to provide a safe environment" was within the Medical
Malpractice Act. 3 ' This construction favored the statute's pro-defendant
purpose.
Two years later, however, the same district had second thoughts
in Winona Memorial Foundation of Indianapolis v. Lomax, another
"slip and fall" case. 36 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was
negligent in not maintaining the floor properly, causing her to trip on
a protruding floorboard. Now the court thought that the statute needed
construction, 1 7 and looked closely at the statutory purpose. It found
that the statute applied only to "classic" medical malpractice, not
liability for ordinary nonmedical accidents,' even though the statute's
broad language defined "health care" as "any act ... by a health
care provider." The court looked at the text of the entire statute and
pointed out that other provisions required an expert medical panel to
give its opinion on whether the health care provider met customary
standards of care. The panel's expertise seemed important only if the
behavior being judged was medical malpractice. 1 Rioux was distinguished on the ground that the plaintiff in that case had alleged failure
to provide appropriate care, and not, as in Lomax, negligence in
maintaining the floor.' 40
As a result of these decisions, the plaintiff's ability to proceed to
settlement negotiations without the Act's limitations depends on careful
drafting of the pleadings.' 4' The plaintiff who alleges negligence in

134. 438 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
135. Id. at 317 n.2.
136. 465 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
137. Id. at 737-38.
138. Id. at 738-39. The court referred to statements by the statute's drafters, who
represented the medical profession, that failed to mention general negligence claims as causing
an insurance crisis for the profession. Id. at 739-40 n.7.
139. Id. at 735.
140. Id. at 741-42.
141. See also Ogle v. St. John's Hickey Memorial Hosp., 473 N.E.2d 1055 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1985) in which a hospital patient admitted because of suicidal tendencies was raped.
Her claim was within the Act because she asserted that the hospital negligently failed to
provide her with proper security, which the court interpreted to mean a failure to properly
confine her, even though the reason why confinement was necessary was her suicidal tendencies,
not a concern with being sexually assaulted. Presumably, if she had alleged negligent supervision
of the rapist, her claim would not have been for malpractice and would be outside the Act.
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building maintenance avoids the Act, at least at the initial stages of
the lawsuit before the facts are developed, but a plaintiff who alleges
improper medical care falls within the statute. This obviously creates
significant liability exposure for medical care providers. The court's
decision to accept this risk depends on its policy judgment about where
to locate the point of statutory equipoise between the concerns of
negligence plaintiffs and defendant health care providers.
The court explicitly accepted these implications later in Methodist
Hospital of Indiana, Inc. v. Ray,'4 2 in which a patient contracted
Legionnairre's disease while in a hospital. The plaintiff alleged that
faulty maintenance of the premises, rather than a nonsterile environment, was responsible for contracting the disease. The court held that
this was sufficient to prevent the Act from applying at the outset of
the case, but acknowledged that the Act might apply if the development
of the facts subsequently demonstrated that medical malpractice was
43
really at issue.
The shift in the court's attitude from Rioux to Lomax and Methodist
Hospital toward permitting the plaintiff's pleadings to avoid initial
coverage by the Medical Malpractice Act demonstrates a shift in the
court's view of the appropriate balance between the statute's prodefendant purpose and the plaintiff's traditional common law negligence
claims. This balance is not determined by the statute, even a statute
with strong private interest antecedents, but depends on the court's
choice about how to balance the conflicting policies that underlie the
statute.
b.

Evolutionary interpretation

The common law always has been associated with evolutionary
change, but courts have a much harder time justifying evolutionary
interpretation of statutes. Except for some statutes with the appropriate

But see Reaux v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hosp., 492 So. 2d 233, 234 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(Louisiana medical malpractice act does not cover case in which health care provider failed
to provide security from intruders).
142. 551 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Id. at 468-69. A conflict between the Act's reach and limits was also resolved in
Collins v. Thakkar, 552 N.E.2d 507, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). A doctor performed a

nonconsensual abortion incident to an examination for pregnancy on a patient with whom
he had had an affair. Because the doctor's action was an intentional tort not performed to
provide medical services, it did not come within the Act. The dissent, id. at 512 (Sullivan,
J.), determined that the Act applied to intentional torts performed in the defendant's capacity
as a medical care provider, and was not limited to cases of medical negligence. See also
Midtown Community Mental Health Center v. Estate of Gahl, 540 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989) (Medical Malpractice Act does not apply to suit against doctor for failing
to warn decedent that a former patient was dangerous).
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text and legislative intent (the classic example is the "restraint of trade"
language in the antitrust laws),'" courts are reluctant to admit that
they update statutes, even when their opinions are best explained in
45
evolutionary terms.
Courts have the easiest time updating statutes when the statute
incorporates a common law power, but even then, judges seem unwilling
to admit to what they are doing. They instead describe the exercise
of this power as an application of the statute. An Indiana case dealing
with the "open and obvious danger" defense to a strict liability tort
4 6
claim illustrates this approach.
The plaintiff in Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co., had been
injured by a machine. The 1978 Product Liability Act explicitly stated
that
the common law of this state with respect to strict liability in
tort is codified and restated as follows: (a) One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any
user or consumer or to his property is [liable under some
circumstances].147
In Bemis Co. v. Rubush'4 and later cases, Indiana common law was
held to include the "open and obvious danger" defense. Nonetheless,
in Koske the supreme court did not incorporate the common law
doctrine into the statute, despite this statutory language. The court
instead focused on other parts of the statutory text and found
the implication unmistakable that the open and obvious danger
rule, as developed in Bemis and its progeny, was excluded from
the Act's codification and restatement of the law of strict
liability in tort. The Act not only employed the language of
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A without explicitly incorporating the words open and obvious, or requiring that a
defect be latent or concealed, but it also expressly delineated
the allowable defenses to strict liability in tort to include eval-

144. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
145. In one case, reluctance to admit a judicial power to change law led the court to
insist that separation of powers required deferring to legislative intent when the legislature
failed to reverse a long line of cases. The concurring judge got it right, however, when he
affirmed the judge's power to decide whether its own decisions remained valid. Cf. Miller
v. Mayberry, 506 N.E.2d 7, 11 (Ind. 1987) with id. at 12 (Shephard, C.J., concurring).
146. Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ind. 1990), rev'g, 526
N.E.2d 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
147. Id. at 441-42 (citing IN. CODE § 33-1-5.1-3 (1988)).
148. 427 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
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uation of the product user's conduct only by a subjective rather
than an objective standard.' 4 9
Rejection of the common law "open and obvious danger" defense
was a reasonable application of the common law as of 1990 but a
forced reading of the 1978 statutory text. The court of appeals, which
had felt compelled to apply the common law rule because of the
statutory language stating that the law was a codification and restatement of the common law, noted the current "trend away from rigid
application of the rule."'' 0 If the statute incorporated an evolving
common law, however, the court was free to reject the open and
obvious danger rule in 1990. Only an unwillingness to admit a surviving
evolutionary common law power' 5 ' can explain the court's forced reading of the statutory text.'

149. Koske, 551 N.E.2d at 442.
150. Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 526 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
Actually, the statute did not compel incorporation of the Bemis rule because that case was
decided in 1981, after passage of the 1978 statute, and Bemis, therefore, was not part of
the statute's context.
151. This decision seems aberrational when compared to a 1989 case affirming liability
to bystanders under the 1978 statute. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Strutco Div., King
Seeley Thermos Co., 540 N.E.2d 597, 597-98 (Ind. 1989). The court emphasized the statute's
incorporation of the common law, which covered bystanders. It shunted aside the statute's
silence about bystanders, contrary to its approach in Koske, supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text, in which silence about the "open and obvious" rule was stressed as a factor
excluding the defense. The only way to reconcile the two cases is on the ground of a judicial
power to develop the common law that survives passage of the statute.
152. The court's reluctance to admit an evolutionary power sometimes extends to cases
in which a common law power parallels statutes that deal partially with a particular problem.
For example, in Clipp v. Weaver, 451 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind. 1983), a guest asserted an ordinary
negligence claim against a boat operator. Indiana statutes provide limited liability for guests
of car and aircraft operators (since 1929 and 1951 respectively). Id. at 1093-94, 1094 n.l.
The common law also provides limited liability to landowners, but that rule has been under
severe attack within legislatures and courts as unconstitutional denials of equal protection
under state constitutions. W. KEarN, PROSSER AND KEar ONTH LAw OF ToRis 216-17
(1984). The common law today would almost certainly favor ordinary negligence rules.
The court properly applied ordinary negligence standards to boat guests in what can be
best understood as an updating of the common law. But it did not rely entirely on the
common law. It cited a statute that boat owners were supposed to behave in a "careful and
prudent manner, having due regard for the rights, safety and property of other persons."
Clipp, 451 N.E.2d at 1094. Instead of just stating that it was using a statute as evidence of
the common law standard of care, the court asserted that the "legislature has determined
that a boat operator owes a duty of reasonable care to all persons, including guests," Id.
(emphasis in original), thereby minimizing the appearance of an exercise of independent judicial
power.
When a statute deals specifically with a problem, it may be difficult to know whether
a parallel common law power survives. See generally G. CALABREsI, A COooN LAw FOR

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1155

When the statute does not incorporate a common law power, the
court's authority to update a statute is more problematic. The court
appeared to exercise such authority, however, in a case where the court
adapted statutory rights to general welfare assistance to modern values. 53 Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township involved a decision by the

township trustee administering general assistance to provide shelter
assistance only to renters, not homeowners. The statute specified that
"[p]ublic aid by an overseer of the poor may include and shall be
extended only when the personal effort of the applicant fails to provide
one or more of the following items: . . . shelter . . . . ,1'u Township
trustees traditionally had great discretion in deciding how to help the

poor. Because of this history, an interpretation of the statute to create
mandatory duties to the poor was very questionable.' Nonetheless,
the court held that the statute required provision of shelter and prohibited discriminating between homeowners and renters. 56 Despite a

TE AGE OF STATUTES 36-37 (1982). A court reluctant to admit it has such a power may

find ways to disguise its exercise. See, e.g., Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1990), in which a common law wrongful discharge claim against an employer for
firing an employee who performed jury duty survived passage of a 1979 statute providing
for the same cause of action with a shorter statute of limitations than the common law
claim. The problem the court encountered was that under Indiana law, statutory rights are
exclusive if they create a right. Id. at 1227. The court held that the plaintiff's right predated
1979, even though it was based on a 1988 case, because the 1988 case evolved from a 1973
decision protecting a plaintiff who was discharged for filing a Workers' Compensation claim.
The more straightforward holding would have been that the court had an evolving common
law power which survived the 1979 statute.
An alternative holding almost said as much. The court stated that the statute did not
provide an exclusive remedy, even if the case law cause of action postdated the 1979 law.
Id. at 1229. The reasoning, however, still concealed the exercise of a surviving common law
power because the court emphasized the statute's failure to state that the remedy was exclusive.
But surely the court was not arguing for a new rule that all statutory remedies are nonexclusive,
absent a specific statutory statement. The court must have been exercising an evolving common
law power to decide on a case by case basis that employer retaliation against employees may
be actionable. The court tipped its hand in this respect when it explicitly noted the important
values underlying jury duty. Id. ("the jury is an indispensable part of our system of justice
). ..
153. Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township 418 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
A change in values should be distinguished from cases of changing facts, to which the
values implicit in an old statute might apply. See, e.g., State v. McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552,
554-55 (Ind. 1985) (computer use did not involve a "taking" when the user did not deprive
the owner of anything), rev'g, 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). The distinction between
fact and value, however, can be overdone. Judges may learn about the meaning of old values
by applying them to new facts.
154. Van Buskirk, 418 N.E.2d at 240 (citing IND. CODE § 12-2-1-10(b) (1976)).
155. See Rosenberg, Overseeing the Poor: A Legal-Administrative Analysis of the Indiana
Township Assistance Program, 6 IND. L. REv. 385, 385-86, 388-90 (1973).
156. Van Buskirk, 418 N.E.2d at 243.
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few half-hearted text-based arguments,'" the core of the decision was
that providing benefits only to renters encouraged owners to default
and become homeless." 8 It is hard to disagree with this policy and
equally hard to justify the result in terms of traditional township trustee
powers. The court was updating the statute to take account of modern
sensibilities. 59
CONCLUSION

Our review of Indiana statutory interpretation cases helps to explain
why this area of law is so complex. The decisions involve many factors
that are easy to identify, but whose role in specific cases is hard to
evaluate.
In any multi-factor analysis, there are two concerns - the weight
and the value of particular variables. First, what weight does each
factor have. In statutory interpretation, for example: Is the text very
important, or just of modest weight? The same question can be asked
about legislative intent and background considerations. Second, what
value does a particular factor have on the facts of a particular case.
Thus, the text may have little value in a particular case because it is
obviously uncertain. And particular background considerations may
have different values for different judges.
Weight and value can interact in complex ways. A factor may have
a high value, such as concern for criminal or welfare claimants. But
that factor's weight may be low because an advocate of text-based
statutory interpretation does not believe that such concerns should ever
be weighty in determining statutory meaning.1' ° To complicate matters,
judicial rhetoric is notoriously misleading in explaining multi-factor
decisions, especially so in statutory interpretation cases, where the
appearance of deference to plain meaning or legislative intent seems
to implement legislative supremacy.

157. Id. at 241. As evidence that the legislature did not intend to limit "shelter" to
renters, the court cited the detailed rule requiring the provision of "medical supplies for
minor injuries and illness" as an example of when the legislature intended a provision to be
precisely limited. The court also referred to the statutory policy favoring a "liberal" interpretation. Id. at 240-41 (citing IND. CoDE. § 12-2-1-34 (1976)).
158. Id. at 241-42 n.6.
159. See also Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n, 424
N.E.2d 1024, 1030-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (civil rights statute permitting cease and desist
order against "persons" applies to government defendants, to implement the strong statutory
policy; traditional rule exempting government from suits not apply in light of the decline of
sovereign immunity as a common law doctrine).
160. A text-based interpreter may use substantive concerns, such as reliance interests,
to support commitment to the text, but not care about their value in a particular case.

1190

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1155

The reality of statutory interpretation is far more complex than
claims of deference to plain meaning or legislative intent imply. The
text and legislative intent are themselves complex concepts. Moreover,
the judge's policy judgments inevitably play a role in shaping the
ultimate decision about what the statute means. At least that is what
the decisions (if not the rhetoric) in the Indiana cases show.
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Appendix - Interpretive Presumptions
The indeterminacy of substantive background presumptions, despite
their frequent invocation by courts, is well established. Although they
may play some role in the back and forth process of working out
statutory meaning, any general claim that they have predictive value
is misleading, as the following citation of Indiana cases indicate.
1. Narrow Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of Common
Law
Followed - Wallis v. Marshall County Comm'rs, 546 N.E.2d 843,
844 (Ind. 1989) (mentions presumption), rev'g, 531 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1988); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Strutco Div., King
Seeley Thermos Co., 540 N.E.2d 597, 598 (Ind. 1989) (mentions presumption), rev'g, 530 N.E.2d 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v.
Johnson, 460 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (mentions presumption); Thomas v. Eads, 400 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(mentions presumption).
Not followed - Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437,
442 (Ind. 1990) (presumption not mentioned), rev'g, 526 N.E.2d 985
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Seymour Nat'l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223
(1981) (majority did not mention presumption, but Justices DeBruler
and Hunter in dissent did; Id. at 1227, 1229), modified, 428 N.E.2d
203, 204 (1981).
II. Liberal Interpretation of Social Legislation
A. Unemployment insurance
Followed - USS, a Div. of USX Corp. v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 527 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
(mentions presumption); Holmes v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 451 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (mentions presumption). Cf. Sidell v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
428 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (trade readjustment benefit
statute - mention presumption).
Not followed - Aaron v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 416 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (presumption not mentioned);
Jeffboat, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 464 N.E.2d
377 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (presumption not mentioned).
B. Means-tested welfare
Followed - Wilson v. Stanton, 424 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981) (mentions presumption).
Not followed - Gary Community Mental Health Center v. Ind.
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 507 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (presumption not mentioned).
III. Strict Construction of Criminal Law
Followed - Cook v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1118, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) (mentions presumption); Douglas v. State, 484 N.E.2d 610, 613
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(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (mentions presumption); Sheppard v. State, 484
N.E.2d 984, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (mentions presumption); State
v. McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind. 1985) (mentions presumption),
rev'g, 459 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Doyle v. State, 468 N.E.2d
528, 533-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (mentions presumption); Gore v.
State, 456 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Och v. State, 431
N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (mentions presumption); Pennington v. State, 426 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ind. 1981) (mentions presumption); Warren v. State, 417 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(mentions presumption); Lasko v. State, 409 N.E.2d 1124, 1127 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980) (mentions presumption).
Not followed - McAnalley v. State, 514 N.E.2d 831, 833-34 (Ind.
1987) (mentions presumption); Hill v. State, 488 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1986)
(presuumption not mentioned), rev'g, 482 N.E.2d 492 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985); Whitley v. State, 553 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (presumption not mentioned); Alvers v. State, 489 N.E.2d 83, 89 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (mentions presumption); Hanic v. State, 406 N.E.2d
335, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (mention presumption).
IV. Tax Law
A. Interpret tax law in favor of taxpayer
Followed - Indiana Dep't of Revenue v. Estate of Eberbach, 535
N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. 1989) (mentions presumption); Wechter v.
Indiana Dep't of Revenue, 544 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ind. T.C. 1989)
(mentions presumption), aff'd, 553 N.E.2d 844 (1990); Indiana Dep't
of State Revenue v. Food Mktg. Corp., 403 N.E.2d 1093, 1096 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980) (mention presumption).
Not followed - Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Ropp, 446
N.E.2d 20, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (mention presumption).
B. Interpret tax exemptions against taxpayer
Followed - Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Div.
v. Estate of Wallace, 408 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(mentions presumption).
Not followed - Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Indianapolis
Pub. Transp. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 1277, 1278 (Ind. 1990) (mentions
presumption); Beasley v. Kwatnez, 445 N.E.2d 1028, 1030 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983) (mentions presumption). Cf. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue
v. National Bank of Logansport, 402 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980) (majority says no ambiguity so no room to interpret statute
strictly against the taxpayer).
V. Rule That Statutes Are Prospective Unless They Are Remedial
or Procedural
Followed - Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 129 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) (statute providing new visitation rights in grandparents after
adoptive parents sever the status held by natural parents is prospective);
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Cardinal Indus. v. Schwartz, 483 N.E.2d 458, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(statute removing the Board's jurisdiction is remedial and therefore
retroactive); Tarver v. Dix, 421 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(statute which codifies common law presumption about who is biological
father is procedural and retroactive). Cf. Wooley v. Comm'r of Motor
Vehicles, 479 N.E.2d 58, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) ("substantive change"
allowing habitual traffic offender to be eligible for probationary license
applied retroactively).
Followed but with some definitional uncertainty about whether
statute is remedial or procedural - Mounts v. State, 496 N.E.2d 37,
39 (Ind. 1986) (procedural statute retroactive; dissent, id. at 40, and
lower court, 489 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), labelled the
statute "substantive" as applied to the facts and therefore prospective);
Arthur v. Arthur, 519 N.E.2d 230, 232-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("substantial change in policy" regarding property rights was prospective),
aff'd, 531 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. 1988) (overruling court of appeals decision
in Sable v. Sable, 506 N.E.2d 495, 496-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), which
had labeled the statute "remedial" and retroactive).
Not followed - even remedial and procedural statutes can be prospective - Gosnell v. Indiana Soft Water Serv., Inc., 503 N.E.2d 879,
880 (Ind. 1987) (allowing punitive damages is remedial but prospective);
State ex rel Indiana State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Judd, 554 N.E.2d
829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (new statute requiring lapsed licensee
to take examination rather than pay fee impairs property rights; statute
labelled remedial but given prospective effect); Turner v. Town of
Speedway, 528 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) ("remedial"
statute prospective because creates new "right").
Decision on retroactivity made without labels - the case of statutes
of limitations - A statute can shorten the period of limitations, but
the courts engraft on the statute a "reasonable time" provision within
which plaintiffs can sue. See Kemper v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 451
N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). The courts also prohibit
revival of expired defendant liability, Indiana Dep't of State Revenue
v. Puett's Estate, 435 N.E.2d 298, 301-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), but
this tidy "rule" will sometimes be violated. For example, a statute
passed after expiration of the two-year statute of limitations on the
mother's paternity cause of action permitted a child to sue for a
paternity determination until his twentieth birthday. R.L.G. v. T.L.E.,
454 N.E.2d 1268, 1270-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). The decision applied
the statute granting the child a cause of action retroactively, even
though the mother's cause of action had expired before the statute
took effect. Undoubtedly the court was influenced because the best
interests of the child were involved. See Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d
1015, 1018-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (parent did not have a vested
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constitutional right in avoiding statutes promoting the best interests of
the child, so statute could be applied retroactively).
VI. Legislative Acquiescence in Agency Rules.
The presumptions reviewed above are substantive in that they make
assumptions about what substantive impact the legislature is likely to
have intended. Another presumption - that the legislature intended
to acquiesce in agency rules - is institutional in the sense of allocating
rulemaking responsibility.
No clear rationale for this presumption is presented in the cases.
The three most prominent are that longstanding rules should be followed, that the agency rule was contemporaneous with adoption of
the statute, and that the agency has expertise. These rationales are
grounded in different policy considerations. Longstanding rules are
likely to have been relied on and to reflect considered agency judgment.
Contemporaneous rules are supposed to reflect the intent of the legislature adopting the governing statute. Agency expertise supports deference to rules regardless of when and how long they have been in
effect. The courts are not only unable to agree on which rationale(s)
to rely on, but also fail to observe that none of them has anything
to do with legislative intent by the acquiescing legislature. Judicial
appeal to legislative acquiescence appears to be another example of
judicial rhetoric that forces judgments into a legislative intent mold
when the decision is based on other grounds.
Legislative acquiescence, even if it is an independent reason to
defer to agency rules, is also a thin reed on which to rest a decision.
Inaction by the legislature may be attributed to many reasons, having
nothing to do with its approval or disapproval of an agency rule. And,
in any event, legislative intent should be manifest through adoption
of a statute, not silence.
There is a fourth rationale for judicial deferrence to an agency
rule. If the legislature is aware of the rule and does not reject it, the
court might place the burden of inaction on the legislature by upholding
the rule. This is not a theory of legislative acquiescence, however, but
of legislative responsibility, for which there is also some evidence in
the Indiana cases.
The reliability of any of these rationales for deferring to agency
rules is, somewhat puzzlingly, called into question by judicial statements
that the court should not defer if the rule is "wrong" or "incorrect."
See Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Fraternal Order of Eagles,
Lodge No. 255, 521 N.E.2d 678, 680 (Ind. 1988); Board of Trustees
of Pub. Employees' Retirement Fund v. Baughman, 450 N.E.2d 95,
96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Lake County Beverage Co. v. 21st Amendment,
Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1008, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Beer Distrib. of
Ind. v. State ex rel. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 431 N.E.2d 836,
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840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Anderson v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 412 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Indiana Dep't
of State Revenue, Gross Income Tax Div. v. Commercial Towel &
Uniform Serv. Inc., 409 N.E.2d 1121, 1123-24 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980).
The following cases contain language advocating one or more of
the above rationales for assuming that the legislature has acquiesced
in an agency rule, although the cases vary in deciding whether the
agency rule should be followed.
A. The rule is longstanding
Fraternal Order of Eagles Lodge No. 255 v. Indiana State Bd. of
Tax Comm'rs, 512 N.E.2d 491, 495-96 (Ind. T.C. 1987), rev'd, 521
N.E.2d 678 (Ind. 1988); Lake County Beverage Co. v. 21st Amendment,
Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1008, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Beer Distrib. of
Ind. v. State ex rel. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 431 N.E.2d 836,
840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Astral Indus. v. Indiana Employment Sec.
Bd., 419 N.E.2d 192, 198 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Indiana Dep't of
State Revenue, Gross Income Tax Div. v. Commercial Towel & Uniform
Serv., 409 N.E.2d 1121, 1123-24 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Indiana
Dep't of State Revenue v. Endress & Hauser, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 1173,
1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
B. The rule is contemporaneous with adoption of statute
Fraternal Order of Eagles Lodge No. 255 v. Indiana State Bd. of
Tax Comm'rs, 512 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ind. T.C. 1987), rev'd, 521 N.E.2d
678 (Ind. 1988); Lake County Beverage Co. v. 21st Amendment, Inc.,
441 N.E.2d 1008, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Beer Distrib. of Ind. v.
State ex rel. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 431 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982); Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, Gross Income Tax
Div. v. Commercial Towel & Uniform Serv., 409 N.E.2d 1121, 112324 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Endress
& Hauser, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 1173, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
C. The agency is knowledgeable
In re CTS Corp., 428 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(specialized agency function requires deference). Cf. Indiana Bell Tel.
Co. v. Boyd, 421 N.E.2d 660, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (construction
by agency charged with implementation); Aaron v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 416 N.E.2d 125, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(same).
D. The legislature is aware of the rule or had an opportunity to
amend the statute to reject the rule and did nothing
Fraternal Order of Eagles Lodge No. 255 v. Indiana State Bd. of
Comm'rs, 512 N.E.2d 491, 496 (Ind. T.C. 1987), rev'd, 521 N.E.2d
678 (Ind. 1988). Cf. Department of Revenue v. United States Steel
Corp., 425 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (legislature presumed
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to approve court's interpretation of law when it failed to take action
rejecting it); Thomas v. Eads, 400 N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (same, when legislature made other amendments but did not
reject court's interpretation).

